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RULES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Catherine C. Blaket 
In response to the Supreme Court's affirmance of the "Ameri-
can Rule," that each party in a lawsuit shall ordinarily bear her own 
attorney's fees,l Congress passed a multitude of fee-shifting statutes.2 
The most frequently invoked are Title VII's provision for attorney's 
fees3 and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.4 These 
statutes, and approximately two hundred others,5 authorize courts 
t Judge, The United States District Court for the District of Maryland. B.A., 
magna cum laude, 1972, Radcliffe College; J.D., cum laude, 1975, Harvard Uni-
versity. 
1. See Alyeska Pipeline Servo CO. V. Wilderness Soc'y., 421 U.S. 240, 240 (1975). 
For the history of the American rule, see id. at 247-57. The Supreme Court 
has offered three justifications for this rule: (1) a party should not be pun-
ished for prosecuting or defending in good faith; (2) the possibility of having 
to pay the other party's attorney's fees might deter individuals of modest 
means from bringing a valid action; and (3) making fee determinations would 
unreasonably burden the judicial system. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. 
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); see also Martin P. Averill, Note, 
"Specters" and ''Litigious Fog"?: The Fourth Circuit Abandons Catalyst Theory in 5-1 
and 5-2 By and Through P-l and P-2 V. State Board of Education of North 
Carolina, 73 N.C. L. REv. 2245, 2251-52 (1995). The "English Rule," that attor-
ney's fees are regularly awarded to the prevailing party, has two justifications: 
(1) the prevailing party should be compensated for aU injuries caused by the 
defeated party; and (2) the possibility of having to pay the prevailing party's 
attorney's fees will deter frivolous litigation. See M. Isabel Medina, Comment, 
Award of Attorney Fees in Bad Faith Breaches of Contract in Louisiana-An Argument 
Against the American Rule, 61 TuL. L. REv. 1173, 1177 n.20 (1987). 
2. See, e.g., The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(e)(4)(B) (1997); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2617(a) (3) (1997); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988(b) (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) 
(1997); see also ALAN HIRSCH & DIANE SHEEHEY, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
AWARDING ATTORNEy'S FEES AND MANAGING FEE LmGATION 2 (1994) ("In [Aly-
eska Pipeline's] wake, such statutes proliferated."), available in (visited March 4, 
1998) <http://www.fjc.gov / attorfees/ attyfees/ attyfees.html>. 
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)(l997); see also Hensley V. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 
429 (1983). 
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; see also Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 271. 
5. See HIRSCH & SHEEHEY, supra note 2, at 1 ("Almost 200 civil statutes authorize 
1 
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to award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party to be paid 
by the opposing party in the litigation. Despite the Supreme Court's 
admonition that" [a] request for attorney's fees should not result in 
a second major litigation,"6 lawyers and judges frequently devote 
substantial amounts of time to preparing, opposing, and ruling on 
petitions for fee awards. This Article reports on the recent adoption 
of a set of rules and guidelines in the District of Maryland which 
are intended to promote efficient, practical, and fair management 
of attorney's fee awards. If these principles are successful, the bar, 
the court, and the parties to civil rights litigation should all benefit. 
CASE LAW STANDARDS 
The standards for determining a reasonable attorney's fee 
award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and related statutes are often quoted. 
The Supreme Court has held that "the proper first step in deter-
mining a reasonable attorney's fee is to multiply 'the number of 
hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable 
hourly rate.' "7 The resulting product is commonly known as the 
lodestar award.8 The Court noted that most of the factors articu-
lated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.9 are subsumed in the initial 
calculation of the "lodestar" award. lO Those factors ll have been 
fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs and, in some cases, prevailing defendants."). 
6. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. 
7. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 
564 (1986)(quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984»; see also 
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 u.S. 87, 94 (1989); Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. 
Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 174 (4th Cir. 1994). 
8. The lodestar award is "the product of reasonable hours multiplied by a rea-
sonable rate." Hendrickson v. Branstad, 934 F.2d 158, 162 (8th Cir. 1991) (cit-
ing Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. at 565). 
" . [W]hen . .. the applicant for a fee has carried his burden of showing 
that the claimed rate and number of hours are reasonable, the resulting prod-
uct is presumed to be the reasonable fee' to which counsel is entitled." Dela-
ware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. at 564 (1986) (quoting Blum, 
465 U.S. at 897). However, "[t]he product of reasonable hours times a reason-
able rate does not end the inquiry. There remain other considerations that 
may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward .... " Hens-
ley, 461 U.S. at 434. 
9. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). 
10. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. 
11. The Johnson factors are: 
(1) the time and labor required to litigate the suit; (2) the novelty 
and difficulty of the questions presented by the lawsuit; (3) the skill 
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adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit. 12 Consideration of those factors in arriving at the reasonable 
rate and the reasonable number of hours ordinarily expended will 
produce a lodestar figure that results in fair compensation without 
further adjustment. 13 
LOCAL RULES 
Like many other federal districts,14 the District of Maryland has 
for years addressed in its Rules oj the United States District Court Jor the 
District oj Maryland (Local Rules) the timing and, to some extent, the 
contents required for attorney's fee petitions at the conclusion of 
trial. 15 Indeed, the Supreme Court encouraged trial courts to set 
required properly to perform the legal service; (4) the preclusion of 
other employment opportunities for the attorney due to the attor-
ney's acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee for such services; 
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations im-
posed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount in contro-
versy involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputa-
tion, and ability of the attorney; (10) the 'undesirability' of the case; 
(11) the nature and length of the attorney's professional relationship 
with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases." 
Trimper v. City of Norfolk, 58 F.3d 68, 73 (4th Cir. 1995). 
12. See ill.; Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 n.18 (4th Cir. 1987); Daly v. Hill, 
790 F.2d 1071, 1077 (4th Cir. 1986). 
13. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-902; Trimper, 58 F.3d at 73-74; National Wildlife Fed'n 
v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 318-19 (4th Cir. 1988)(quoting Daly, 790 F.2d at 
1078). 
14. See HIRSCH & SHEEHEY, supra note 2, at 111-17 for a discussion of other dis-
tricts' local rules, guidelines, and written opinions. See id. at apps. A, D & E 
for examples of local rules and guidelines. 
15. D. MD. R 109.2 provides: 
a. Time far filing. Unless otherwise provided by statute, Local Rule 
109.2.c. or otherwise ordered by the Court, any motion (includ-
ing motions filed under Fed. R Civ. P. 11) requesting the award 
of attorney's fees must be filed within fourteen days of the entry 
of judgment for all services performed prior thereto. The motion 
may be supplemented to request fees for any work done thereaf-
ter in connection with any post-trial motion. A motion seeking 
fees for services performed on appeal shall be filed within four-
teen days of the issuance of the mandate by the Court of Appeals 
or, in the event of review by the Supreme Court, within fourteen 
days of the entry of judgment by the Supreme Court. Non-com-
pliance with these time limits shall be deemed to be a waiver of 
any claim for attorney's fees. 
b. Contents. Any motion requesting the award of attorney's fees must 
set forth the nature of the case, the claims as to which the party 
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such deadlines in White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Se-
curity.16 The Court held that a request for attorney's fees under 42 
U .S.C. § 1988 did not constitute a motion to alter or amend judg-
ment subject to the ten-day limit of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,17 but that district courts were free to adopt local rules estab-
lishing timeliness standards for filing fee petitions. IS 
FORMULATION OF RULES AND GUIDELINES IN THE DIS-
TRICT OF MARYlAND 
While the Local Rules provided a general outline of the format 
to be followed in an attorney's fee petition, it did not address many 
of the specific, recurring issues that judges and lawyers routinely en-
countered when dealing with a particular petition. 
In October 1996, Chief Judge J. Frederick Motz convened an ad 
hoc committee on attorney's fee awards to consider the formulation 
of rules and guidelines for addressing attorney's fee awards in the 
District of Maryland. 19 Over the course of several meetings between 
[d. 
prevailed, the claims as to which the party did not prevail, a de-
tailed description of the work performed broken down by hours 
or fractions thereof expended on each task, the attorney's cus-
tomary fee for such like work, the customary fee for like work 
prevailing in the attorney's community, a listing of any expendi-
tures for which reimbursement is sought, any additional factors 
which are required by the case law, and any additional factors 
that the attorney wishes to bring to the Court's attention. Any 
motion for attorney's fees in civil rights and discrimination cases 
shall be prepared in accordance with the Rules and Guidelines 
for Determining Lodestar Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Dis-
crimination Cases that are an appendix to these Rules. 
16. 455 U.S. 445, 453 (1982). 
17. FED. R CIV. P. 59(e). 
18. See White, 455 U.S. at 454; see also Marryshow v. Flynn, 986 F.2d 689, 693-94 (4th 
Cir. 1993) (permitting amendment of attorney's fee petition that was timely 
filed under local rule); Jackson v. Beard, 828 F.2d 1077, 1079-80 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(filing of post judgment motions did not delay running of time under local 
rule to file attorney's fee petition). 
19. The court was fortunate to have a distinguished group of practitioners from a 
variety of geographical and career backgrounds who were willing to serve on 
the committee. By current practice or past experience, the committee mem-
bers represented the plaintiffs' bar, the defense bar, public interest lawyers, 
the Maryland Attorney General's Office, and large, medium, and solo-practice 
firms from both the Northern and Southern Divisions of the District of Mary-
land. Members included attorneys Susan Goering, George W. Johnston, Fred 
R Joseph, Andrew D. Levy, Susan Sugar Nathan, and Ralph Tyler. District 
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October 1996 and February 1997, the committee developed and rec-
ommended to the court a proposed set of rules and guidelines. In 
March 1997, the proposed rules and guidelines were approved with 
minor changes and sent out for public comment. Mter considera-
tion of the comments received, the Rules and Guidelines for Determin-
ing Lodestar Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Discrimination CaseSZo 
(Rules and Guidelines) was adopted as Appendix B to the Local Rules 
effective July 1, 1997. As the court and the bar gain experience in 
the use of the Rules and Guidelines, the committee will monitor their 
fairness and effectiveness so that modifications may be proposed if 
necessary and considered in conjunction with the court's periodic 
revision of the Local Rules. 21 The following is an overview and discus-
sion of some of the major provisions of the Rules and Guidelines and 
the reasons for their adoption. 
UNIFORM FORMAT AND QUARTERLY STATEMENTS 
One of the principal purposes of the Rules and Guidelines was to 
promote uniformity and consistency for the benefit of judges re-
viewing fee petitions as well as lawyers preparing or opposing them. 
A common topic of fee litigation is the adequacy of time and billing 
Judges J. Frederick Motz and Catherine C. Blake and Magistrate Judge Wil-
liam Connelly also participated. 
20. D. MD. R. app. B. [hereinafter RULES AND GUIDEUNES]. The complete RULES 
AND GUIDEUNES are set forth as Appendix of this Article. As the title indicates, 
the RULES AND GUIDEUNES are intended to cover the great majority of fee peti-
tions litigated in the District of Maryland; that is, those brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1988, the various discrimination statutes, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B) 
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3) of 
the Family and Medical Leave Act, and similar "prevailing party" provisions 
which the Supreme Court generally considers analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983); Combs v. School Bd., 15 
F.3d 357, 360 (4th Cir. 1994). The rules do not specifically apply to Social Se-
curity cases, claims under ERISA, or the various intellectual property statutes, 
class actions, and other less frequently invoked fee provisions. See RULES AND 
GUIDEUNES, supra, at n.l. In other cases, a guideline may be useful by analogy. 
Indeed, the principles applicable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 generally apply to 
bankruptcy cases. See Harman v. Levin, 772 F.2d 1150, 1150 (4th Cir. 1985). 
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland, however, 
has its own attorney's fee guidelines. See D. MD. BANKR. R. app. D. 
21. For example, as reasonable market rates change, the court will periodically 
need to reevaluate the specific dollar amounts enumerated in the RULES AND 
GUIDEUNES, supra note 20, §§ 34. See generally infra note 29 (detailing current 
rules). 
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records provided in support of a fee petition.22 Although the time 
and billing maintained for an individual lawyer's or firm's practice 
may be satisfactory to its clients, it may be unacceptable to the court 
or to opposing counsel who is trying to determine or challenge the 
validity of a particular claimed item in a fee petition.23 
Accordingly, the committee proposed, and the court adopted, 
mandatory rules regarding the billing format and method of record-
ing time to be used in submission of fee applications.24 The advan-
tages of a uniform billing format have been discussed among the 
bar and its major corporate clients for some time. In May 1995 a 
Uniform Task-Based Management System: Litigation Code Sef-S (ABA Code 
Set) was published as the result of collaborative efforts of the ABA 
Section of Litigation, the American Corporate Counsel Association, 
and a group of corporate clients and law firms.26 The system divides 
the litigation process into five "phases," breaks those phases down 
into "tasks," and identifies "activity codes" to be used to designate 
specific work within each task.27 Clients indicated that use of the 
ABA Code Set facilitated easier review and comparison of the bills 
they received for legal services, as well as the ability to develop a 
data base for budgeting and cost projection.28 
However, after experimentation with the ABA Code Set, the com-
mittee recommended against its adoption. One of the firms repre-
sented on the attorney's fee committee expressed concerns about 
the system after its experimental phase. In particular, there was con-
cern expressed on behalf of smaller practitioners for whom a sub-
stantial investment of time and software might be required to imple-
ment its use. Instead of adopting the ABA Code Set, the committee 
formulated its own rules, identifying ten litigation phases or catego-
ries under which time should be recorded and then reported on 
the fee application.29 In general, preparation, investigation, and 
22. See Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d i69, 179-80 (4th Cir. 
1994); Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1079-80 (4th Cir. 1986). 
23. See, e.g., Rum Creek, 31 F.3d at 180; Daly, 790 F.2d at 1079-80. 
24. See generally RULES AND GUIDEUNES, supra note 20. 
25. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, UNIFORM TASK-BASED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: LITIGA· 
TION CODE SET (1995). 
26. See Angela Ward, Uniform Code Assigned for Every Task and Any User Easier Method 
for Counsel to Compare, Analyze Bills, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1995, at 32. These 
efforts were coordinated and supported by the accounting firm Price 
Waterhouse. See id. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. 
29. See RULES AND GUIDEUNES, supra note 20, § l(b). These phases are: 
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travel time should be recorded under the category to which they re-
late. 30 As noted, this section of the Rules and Guidelines is 
mandatory.31 
The court and the committee anticipate several benefits from 
the use of a uniform format. First, it should save time for both the 
judge reviewing the fee petition and the lawyers preparing or op-
posing it. The judge will be able to determine the amount of hours 
reasonably expended on each aspect of the case more easily; the 
prevailing party's lawyer will have a model for organizing and 
presenting time that she knows will be accepted by the court; and 
the lawyer deciding whether to challenge the petition will be able 
to discern on which tasks his opponent may have spent excessive 
amounts of time. Second, it will permit development of a database 
that will provide more accurate comparison of the fees requested in 
particular types of cases and will be useful to the court in its overall 
management of attorney's fee petitions. Third, as further discussed 
below, the uniform format should assist in the process of settling 
cases where attorney's fees are involved. 
The accurate evaluation of a potential attorney's fee award is 
often critical to achieving settlement in civil rights cases.32 In the 
Id. 
(1) Case development, background investigation and case adminis-
tration (includes initial investigations, file setup, preparation of 
budgets, and routine communications with client, co-counsel, 
opposing counsel, and the court) 
(2) Pleadings 
(3) Interrogatories, document production and other discovery 
(4) Depositions(includes time spent preparing for depositions) 
(5) Motions practice 
(6) Attending court hearings 
(7) Trial preparation and post-trial motions 
(8) Attending trial 
(9) ADR [and] 
(10) Fee petition preparation. 
30. See id. § 1 (b) n.2. 
31. See id. ("Mandatory Rules Regarding Billing Format, Time Recordation, and 
Submission of Quarterly Statements" (emphasis added». 
32. The settlement judge must recognize the potential for practical, if not actual, 
conflicts between a lawyer and her client on the subject of attorney's fees, par-
ticularly because defendants are often interested in a complete settlement for 
a negotiated amount of money, regardless of how the plaintiff and her lawyer 
intend to divide it. See, e.g., Evans v. Jeff D., 475 u.S. 717, 723 n.6 
(1986) (" [A]n attorney ... can be put in the position of either negotiating for 
his client or negotiating for his attorney's fees .... "); White v. New Ramp-
8 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 27 
District of Maryland, United States Magistrate Judges often conduct 
settlement conferences at the request of the parties and at the en-
couragement of District Judges. The District's uniform scheduling 
order suggests holding a settlement conference at the conclusion of 
discovery and permits it at the early stages of litigation if both sides 
think it would be helpful. The Rules and Guidelines explicitly permit 
the judicial officer or private mediator conducting the conference 
to request time records in the litigation phase format from all coun-
sel. 33 These records will ordinarily be submitted separately, on an ex 
parte basis, together with the other information the judge receives 
from each side in advance of the conference. This information al-
lows the settlement judge to discuss with each side and, to the ex-
tent appropriate, share with the opposing side, information con-
cerning the likely amount of any fee award and the anticipated 
costs of further litigation, which can be of great assistance in achiev-
ing resolution of the case. 
Another mandatory provision intended to facilitate settlement 
is the requirement that counsel who may be seeking fees submit to 
opposing counsel quarterly statements showing the amount of time 
spent on the case and the value of that time.34 To alleviate concerns 
about disclosing an attorney's work-product, the quarterly state-
ments do not need to be in the litigation phase format or otherwise 
reveal how counsel's time was spent.35 Frequently, however, defense 
counsel attempting to evaluate a client's risks and benefits must do 
so without sufficient information. For example, in weighing the 
risks and benefits of a possible settlement offer or offer ·of judgment 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, defense counsel has no ready 
way to assess the amount of attorney's fees the plaintiff will claim.36 
This may be particularly true for public agency lawyers who do not 
maintain billing records for their work. The quarterly statements 
provide such information and put defense counsel on notice of a 
client's potential exposure if the plaintiff prevails. 
In some cases, of course, there is no settlement and the judge 
shire, 455 U.S. 445, 454 n.15 (1982) ("Although such situations may raise diffi-
cult ethical issues for a plaintiffs attorney, we are reluctant to hold that no 
resolution is ever available to ethical counsel."). 
33. See RULES AND GUIDEUNES, supra note 20, § 1 (d). 
34. See id. § l(c). 
35. See id. 
36. For a discussion of the relationship between FED. R CIV. P. 68 and attorney's 
fees, see Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Ctr., 88 F.3d 1332, 1337-38 (4th Cir. 
1996). 
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must rule on a fee petition filed by the prevailing party.37 At this 
stage, the litigation phase format will apply to both parties if the 
judge presiding over the fee dispute finds it appropriate to require 
the opposing party to disclose her attorney's fees. 38 This situation 
often occurs when there is a dispute about the reasonable number 
of hours counsel has expended. While there are many reasons fee 
amounts will differ, the time expended by the losing side on a par-
ticular aspect of the litigation bears at least some relevance to the 
reasonableness of the time claimed by the prevailing side.39 
REIMBURSABLE EXPENSES 
In addition to the uniform format, the other mandatory aspects 
of the Rules and Guidelines are the provisions setting rates for certain 
reimbursable expenses.40 In the Fourth Circuit, a prevailing party is 
entitled to compensation for reasonable litigation expenses "which 
are normally charged to a fee-paying client, in the course of provid-
ing legal services,"41 provided they are properly documented.42 To 
avoid litigation over issues such as the rate for mileage and in-house 
copying, the committee recommended a uniform approach to the 
reimbursement of expenses.43 This uniform approach to reimburse-
ment will make counsel aware in advance that they can recover cer-
tain expenditures; for example, the actual cost of computerized re-
search. Nevertheless, the party seeking fees must be prepared to 
show that the expense was reasonably incurred; thus, for example, 
37. Where the defendant is the prevailing party, fees will ordinarily be awarded 
only upon a showing that the plaintiff's claim was "frivolous, unreasonable, or 
without foundation," or that "the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly 
became so." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 
(1978); accord Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1079, 1080-81 (4th Cir. 
1993). 
38. See RULES AND GUIDEUNES, supra note 20, § l(d)-(e). 
39. See grneraUy id. § 1. 
40. See id. § 4. "Mileage is compensable at 0.30 per mile." [d. § 4(b). "In house 
copying is compensable at 0.15 per page; commercial copying at actual cost." 
[d. § 4(c). 
41. Spell v. McDaniel, 852 F.2d 762, 771 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting Northcross v. 
Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir. 1979». 
42. See Trimper v. City of Norfolk, 58 F.3d 68, 77. (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding the 
lower court's decision to deny attorney's fees based upon inadequate docu-
mentation); Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1087 (4th Cir. 1986) (Kellman, J., dis-
senting) (noting that it was within the trial court's discretion to determine 
whether attorney's fees were properly documented). 
43. See RULES AND GUIDEUNES, supra note 20, § 4. 
10 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 27 
unlimited use 9f the fax machine or express delivery services is not 
encouraged. 
COMPENSABLE TIME 
In other areas of the fee pennon, the court adopted a more 
flexible approach by setting guidelines that will yield to the necessi-
ties of a particular case. Nonetheless, these guidelines provide a 
framework for determining, under most circumstances, what will 
and will not be approved as a reasonable expenditure of time. With-
out attempting to cover all possible areas of dispute, this framework 
focuses on issues that have most often been the source of disagree-
ment between the parties and the court. Encouraging efficient use 
of lawyers' time and avoiding duplication of efforts are central to 
the approach taken by the court.44 These parameters are consistent 
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's ad-
monition that "in seeking attorney's fees under section 1988, attor-
neys are under a duty to minimize expenses. "45 
For example, the guidelines provide that ordinarily only one 
lawyer for each separately represented party should be compensated 
for attending depositions and hearings.46 As this is a guideline and 
not a rule, a party seeking fees for two lawyers is permitted to ex-
plain why two lawyers were necessary or, perhaps, more efficient 
than preparing one lawyer to handle the hearing alone.47 Further, 
this guideline is not meant to establish an unequal playing field; if 
the defendant is paying for more than one attorney to attend a 
hearing or deposition, courts should consider this as a factor when 
determining the reasonableness of having more than one lawyer 
present for the plaintiff.48 
Another area covered by the guidelines is compensation for in-
tra-office conferences.49 The committee and the court recognized 
44. See id. 
45. Trimper, 58 F.3d at 76. Indeed, an outrageously excessive request for fees may 
be denied in its entirety. See Fair Hous. Council of Greater Wash. v. Landow, 
999 F.2d 92, 96 (4th Cir. 1993). 
46. See Trimper, 58 F.3d at 76 (citing Daly, 790 F.2d at 1080); Goodwin v. Metts, 973 
F.2d 378, 383-84 (4th Cir. 1992); Daly, 790 F.2d at 1080. 
47. An example provided in a footnote to the RULES AND GUIDEUNES provides: two 
attorneys at a deposition may be reasonable where a less senior attorney or-
ganized numerous documents important to a deposition, but the witness is 
critical to the case and should be examined by a more senior attorney. See 
RULES AND GUIDEUNES, supra note 20, § 2(b) n.3. 
48. [d. 
49. [d. § 2(e). 
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that there may be a legitimate need for junior attorneys to confer 
with senior attorneys. Also, attorneys handling different aspects of 
the litigation may need to meet and confer. However, this is one of 
the aspects of a fee petition that is subject to the greatest potential 
for abuse and that is the most difficult to evaluate.5o As a guideline, 
the court has chosen to compensate only one lawyer for intra-office 
conferences, but the time may be charged at the rate of the most 
senior lawyer participatingY Nonetheless, the guidelines recognize 
an exception for cases requiring regular meetings as an aspect of ef-
ficient management.52 
Another aspect of the guidelines that has been the subject of 
debate in court opinions, as well as among the committee members, 
is compensation for travel time. Travel expenses, where necessary 
and reasonable, have been recognized as compensable by the 
Fourth Circuit.53 Several other courts apply a test of necessity and 
reasonableness for travel time as well.54 
Assuming travel time itself has been found necessary and rea-
sonable, courts have nonetheless been divided on the appropriate 
hourly rate to be applied in compensating such time.55 Mter consid-
50. See, e.g., Goodwin, 973 F.2d at 383-84 (discussing the duplication of efforts 
through the overstaffing of attorneys). 
51. Specifically, RULES AND GUIDEUNES. supra note 20, § 2(e) provides: "Compensa-
tion may be paid for the attendance of more than one lawyer at periodic con-
ferences of defined duration held for the purpose of work organization and 
delegation of tasks in cases where such conferences are reasonably necessary 
for the proper management of the litigation." Id. 
52. See id. 
53. See Herold v. Hajoca Corp., 864 F.2d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 1988); Wheeler v. Dur-
ham City Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 618, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1978). 
54. See In re North, 59 F.3d 184, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (disallowing both travel 
time and travel expenses caused by the unjustified use of out-of-town counsel); 
Henry v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 194 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that where 
the amount of time spent in travel was reasonable, the appropriate billing rate 
was the same as that set for other time spent working on the case); McDowell 
v. Moore, 635 F. Supp. 280, 283 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (reducing fee request where 
court could not determine necessity or reasonableness of employing out-of-
town counsel). 
55. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit supports the use 
of the full hourly rate, unless the time is also being used to perform work for 
another client. See Henry, 738 F.2d at 194; see also Crumbaker v. Merit Sys. Pro-
tection Bd., 781 F.2d 191, 193-94 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (following Henry in a case 
awarding fees under 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (g)(l) (1986», modified, 827 F.2d 761 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987); Mallory v. Harkness, 923 F. Supp. 1546, 1556-57 (S.D. Fla. 1996), 
a/i'd, 109 F.3d 771 (lIth Cir. 1997) (compensating travel time at full hourly 
rate). Another line of cases, however, supports the application of a reduced 
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ering the case law and the geography of the State and the District 
of Maryland, the committee and the court reached a compromise: 
"Up to 2 hours of travel time (each way and each day) to and from 
a court appearance, deposition, witness interview, or similar pro-
ceeding that cannot be devoted to substantive work may be charged 
at the lawyer's usual rate .... [Additional time] may be charged at 
one-half of the lawyer's usual rate. "56 
HOURLY RATES 
Finally, the committee and the court considered the issue of 
hourly rates. Ordinarily, to establish a reasonable hourly rate, appli-
cants must provide specific evidence of the "prevailing market rates 
in the relevant community" for the type of work for which fees are 
sought.57 The rate must be determined in light of the particular 
type of litigation involved, for example civil rights.58 The reasonable 
rate for individual lawyers depends in part on their experience and 
qualifications, as well as the actual rate they can command on the 
market.59 Additionally, the presiding judge is entitled to rely on her 
personal knowledge of prevailing market rates in the relevant com-
munity and on evidence of rates awarded in recent, similar cases.60 
hourly rate, usually half the full rate. See Marryshow v. Flynn, 986 F.2d 689, 
693-94 (4th Cir. 1993) (upholding the magistrate judge's award of a reduced 
rate for travel time); McDonald V. Armontrout, 860 F.2d 1456, 1462-63 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (finding no error in an award for fees at half of the hourly rate); In 
re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 238 (2d Cir. 1987) (observing 
that it was not unusual for travel to be compensated at lower rates); Maceira V. 
Pagan, 698 F.2d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting that counsel agreed that one-
half of the hourly rate for travel time was reasonable); Watkins v. Fordice, 807 
F. Supp. 406, 414 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (awarding compensation for travel time at 
one-half of counsel's hourly rate); Sun Publ'g Co., Inc. V. Mecklenburg News, 
Inc., 594 F. Supp. 1512, 1520 (E.D. Va. 1984) (finding it unreasonable to pay 
an attorney the same rate for travel as for "in-court or other active time") im-
plied overruling recognized by Board of Dirs., Water's Edge V. Anden Group, 135 
F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
56. RULES AND GUIDEUNES, supra note 20, § 2(f) (ii)-(iii). 
57. Blum V. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 & n.ll (1984); see Trimper V. City of 
Norfolk, 58 F.3d 68, 76 (4th Cir. 1995); Spell V. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 
(4th Cir. 1987). 
58. See Buffington V. Baltimore County, 913 F.2d 113, 130 (4th Cir. 1990). 
59. See SPel~ 824 F.2d at 1402; Daly V. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1082 (4th Cir. 1986). 
60. See Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. V. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 179 (4th Cir. 1994); 
SPel~ 824 F.2d at 1402-03; Sheppard V. Riverview Nursing Ctr., 870 F. Supp. 
1369, 1377 (D. Md. 1994), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 88 F.3d 1332 
(4th Cir.), and cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 483 (1996). 
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Recognizing these principles, the committee and the court de-
cided to establish two guideline ranges for hourly fees based on 
years of experience.61 While the applicable case law must control in 
a particular case, the ranges established in the Rules and Guidelines 
are nevertheless intended to provide some practical guidance in or-
der to narrow the debate over the range of reasonable rates. 
The task of identifying a true market rate for plaintiffs' attor-
neys may be quite difficult in an area where fee arrangements are 
ordinarily contingent. It is rare to find a civil rights plaintiff who 
pays a predetermined hourly rate for services regardless of the out-
come. Generally, the rate necessary to achieve" 'effective access to 
the judicial process' for persons with civil rights grievances," the 
cornerstone of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, will differ from rates charged to 
other clients. Ordinarily, civil rights plaintiffs are charged higher 
rates than the rate necessary to achieve representation for most de-
fendants because there is less certainty of payment in civil rights 
cases.62 Accordingly, the guideline ranges are based on two principal 
sources: (1) fees awarded in the District of Maryland in recent cases 
where the plaintiffs submitted affidavits attesting to the prevailing 
rates and judges relied on their personal knowledge of those rates, 
and (2) information concerning hourly rates generally paid to de-
fense attorneys for discrimination and civil rights cases in the Dis-
trict of Maryland, with an upward adjustment to account for the 
risk of nonpayment to plaintiffs' lawyers if their clients do not pre-
vail. 63 The reasonableness of the ranges established by the Rules and 
Guidelines is supported by the fact that both methods of identifying 
rates came to essentially similar results. 
Comments received by the committee suggest that some practi-
tioners may believe the Rules and Guidelines favor the defense in 
their treatment of the hours that will be compensated. Even if such 
61. See RULES AND GUIDEUNES, supra note 20, § 3. Those rates are "a. Lawyers ad-
mitted to the bar for less than eight years: $135-170[;] b. [l]awyers admitted to 
the bar for more than eight years: $190-225[;] c. [p]aralegals and law clerks: 
$65." Id. 
62. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). 
63. In City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992), the Supreme Court held 
that the risk or contingency of nonpayment is not a basis for an upward ad-
justment of the lodestar fee, see id. at 561, and the RULES AND GUIDEUNES do 
not contemplate such an adjustment. Risk of nonpayment, however, is a factor 
which the market validly considers in determining what rate is necessary to at-
tract effective legal representation for a client who cannot pay if she does not 
prevail. 
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a tendency exists, however, it should be adequately offset by the 
court's and the committee's attempt to set hourly rates that recog-
nize the genuine risks and difficulties inherent in plaintiffs' civil 
rights and employment claims. 
These risks may indeed be somewhat greater in the Fourth Cir-
cuit than in other areas of the country because the Fourth Circuit 
has significantly restricted the circumstances under which a plaintiff 
may be deemed a prevailing party. Relying on the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Farrar v. Hobby,64 a case where fees were sought, the 
court of appeals held that" [a] person may not be a 'prevailing 
party' plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 except by virtue of having 
obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement 
giving some of the legal relief sought in a § 1983 action."65 The 
court of appeals further explained: "[T]he fact that a lawsuit may 
operate as a catalyst for post-litigation changes in a defendant's con-
duct cannot suffice to establish plaintiff as a prevailing party. 'Cata-
lyst theory,' allowing that result, is no longer available for that pur-
pose."66 This additional barrier to the recovery of fees also must be 
considered by attorneys deciding whether to take on a potentially 
worthwhile, but time-consuming and expensive battle on behalf of 
an individual's civil rights.67 
64. 506 u.s. 103 (1992). Under Farrar, a judgment for nominal damages is suffi-
cient to establish a plaintiff as a prevailing party, but if the only relief sought 
was monetary, nominal damages may not be a sufficiently successful result to 
warrant an award of fees. See id. at 114-15. 
65. 8-1 and 8-2 By and Through P-l and P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 
49,51 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (7-6 decision) (adopting as its own Judge Wil-
kinson's dissenting opinion in 8-1 and 8-2 By and Through P-l and P-2 v. State 
Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 6 F.3d 160, 168-72 (4th Cir. 1993». 
66. [d. (citing Farrar, 506 U.S. at 112-13, and Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316 (4th 
Cir. 1979»; see also Arvinger v. Mayor of Baltimore, 31 F.3d 196, 202·.()3 (4th 
Cir. 1994); Clark v. Sims, 28 F.3d 420, 425 (4th Cir. 1994). While Clark reaf-
firmed the court of appeals's position in S-1 and S-2, the district court held on 
remand that S-1 and S-2 does not foreclose application of the catalyst theory 
in evaluating a party's level of success after the plaintiff has been determined 
to be a prevailing party. See Clark v. Sims, 894 F. Supp. 868, 871 (D. Md. 1995) 
(mem.). The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina 
also adopted this narrow construction of S-1 and S-2 in Lucas v. Guyton, 901 F. 
Supp. 1047, 1055-56 (D. S.C. 1995). 
67. The Fourth Circuit apparently stands alone in its interpretation that Farrar re-
jects the catalyst theory. Other circuits that have considered the prevailing 
party issue post-Farrar have recognized the continued viability of the catalyst 
theory. See Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1995); Kilgour v. City of 
Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995); Cady v. City of Chicago, 43 F.3d 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rules and Guidelines are intended to serve fairness by im-
posing some greater degree of predictability on the court. Arbitrary 
or unjustified reductions in fees compromise the even-handed en-
forcement of civil rights that is essential to the rule of law. While in-
dividual judges will vary in their approach to attorney's fees, as they 
do with other issues, the court has a collective responsibility to limit 
the arbitrary range of that variability. Lawyers and parties who com-
ply with the Rules and Guidelines, exercise sound billing judgment, 
and present a well-supported petition to the court have a right to 
expect that judges in the District of Maryland also will abide by 
these principles. With the compliance of attorneys and judges alike, 
the Rules and Guidelines should further the congressional goal of 
awarding fair and reasonable fees that make possible the individual 
vindication of civil rights. 
326, 328 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951-52 (10th Cir. 
1994); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 550 (3d Cir. 
1994); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 17 F.3d 260, 
263 n.2 (8th Cir. 1994); Craig v. Gregg County, Tex., 988 F.2d 18, 20-21 (5th 
Cir. 1993); Citizens Against Tax Waste v. Westerville City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 985 F.2d 255, 257-58 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Averill, supra note 1, at 
2283 ("[T]he Fourth Circuit's lonely stance as the sole circuit to abandon cat-
alyst theory ... paints [it] as the least solicitous of civil rights enforcement 
.... "). 
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APPENDIX 
RULES AND GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING LODESTAR AT-
TORNEYS' FEES IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION 
CASESl 
1. Mandatory Rules Regarding Billing Format, Time Recordation, and 
Submission of Q;tarterly Statements. 
a. Time shall be recorded by specific task and lawyer or other 
professional performing the task as set forth more fully in Local 
Rule I09.2.b. 
b. Fee applications, accompanied by time records, shall be sub-
mitted in the following format organized by litigation phase.2 
Case development, background investigation and case 
administration 
(Includes initial investigations, file setup, preparation of budg-
ets, and routine communications with client, co-counsel, opposing 
counsel, and the court) 
Pleadings 
Interrogatories, document production and other discovery 
Depositions (Includes time spent preparing for depositions) 
Motions practice 
Attending court hearings 
Trial preparation and post-trial motions 
Attending trial 
1. These rules and guidelines apply to cases in which a prevailing party would be 
entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. section 1988(b) and to 
cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Americans With Disabilities 
Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 
the Family and Medical Leave Act and equivalent statutes. They do not apply 
to Social Security cases. 
2. In general, preparation time and travel time should be reported under the 
category to which they relate. For example, time spent preparing for and trav-
eling to and from a court hearing should be recorded under the category 
"Court hearings.» Factual investigation should also be listed under the specific 
category to which it relates. For example, time spent with a witness to obtain 
an affidavit for a summary judgment motion or opposition should be included 
under the category "Motions practice." Similarly, a telephone conversation or 
a meeting with a client held for the purpose of preparing interrogatory an-
swers should be included under the category "Interrogatories, document pro-
duction and other written discovery." Of course, each of these tasks must be 
separately recorded in the back-up documentation in accordance with Guide-
line 1 (a). 
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ADR 
Fee petition preparation 
c. Counsel for a party intending to seek fees if the party 
prevails shall submit to opposing counsel quarterly statements show-
ing the amount of time spent on the case and the total value of 
that time. These statements need not be in the "litigation phase" 
format provided in Guideline 1 (b) or otherwise reflect how time 
has been spent. The first such statement is due at the end of the 
first quarter in which the action is filed. 
d. Upon request by the judicial officer (or private mediator 
agreed upon by the parties) presiding over a settlement conference, 
counsel for all parties (with the exception of public lawyers who do 
not ordinarily keep time records) shall turn over to that officer (or 
mediator) statements of time and the value of that time in the "liti-
gation phase" format provided in Guideline 1 (b) . 
e. If during the course of a fee award dispute a judicial officer 
orders that the billing records of counsel for the party opposing 
fees must be turned over to the party requesting fees, those billing 
records shall be submitted in the "litigation phase" format. 
2. Guidelines re Compensable and Non-compensable Time. 
a. Where plaintiffs with both common and conflicting interests 
are represented by different lawyers, there shall be a lead attorney 
for each task (e.g., preparing for and speaking at depositions on is-
sues of common interest and preparing pleadings, motions, and 
memoranda), and other lawyers shall be compensated only to the 
extent that they provide input into the activity directly related to 
their own client's interests. 
b. Only one lawyer for each separately represented party shall 
be compensated for attending depositions.3 
3. Departure from this guideline would be appropriate upon a showing of a 
valid reason for sending two attorneys to the deposition, e.g. that the less se-
nior attorney's presence is necessary because he organized numerous docu-
ments important to the deposition but the deposition is of a critical witness 
whom the more senior attorney should properly depose. Departure from the 
guideline also would be appropriate upon a showing that more than one re-
tained attorney representing the defendant attended the deposition and 
charged the time for her attendance. (If two lawyers from a public law office 
representing a defendant attend a deposition, the court should consider this 
fact and the role played by the second lawyer, Le., whether she provided assis-
tance, including representation of a separate public agency or individual 
defendant, or was present for merely educational purposes, in determining 
whether plaintiff should also be compensated for having a second lawyer at-
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c. Only one lawyer for each party shall be compensated for cli-
ent and third party conferences. 
d. Only one lawyer for each party shall be compensated for at-
tending hearings.4 
e. Generally, only one lawyer is to be compensated for intra-
office conferences. If during such a conference one lawyer is seek-
ing the advice of another lawyer, the time may be charged at the 
rate of the more senior lawyer. Compensation may be paid for the 
attendance of more than one lawyer at periodic conferences of de-
fined duration held for the purpose of work organization and dele-
gation of tasks in cases where such conferences are reasonably nec-
essary for the proper management of the litigation. 
f. Travel. 
i. Whenever possible time spent in traveling should be devoted 
to doing substantive work for a client and should be billed (at the 
usual rate) to that client. If the travel time is devoted to work for a 
client other than the matter for which fees are sought, then the 
travel time should not be included in any fee request. If the travel 
time is devoted to substantive work for the client whose representa-
tion is the subject of the fee request, then the time should be billed 
for the substantive work, not travel time. 
ii. Up to 2 hours of travel time (each way and each day) to and 
from a court appearance, deposition, witness interview, or similar 
proceeding that cannot be devoted to substantive work may be 
charged at the lawyer's usual rate. 
iii. Time spent in long-distance travel above the 2 hours limit 
each way that cannot be devoted to substantive work, may be 
charged at one-half of the lawyer's usual rate. 
tend.} 
4. The same considerations discussed in footnote 3 concerning attendance by 
more than one lawyer at a deposition also apply to attendance by more than 
one lawyer at a hearing. There is no guideline as to whether more than one 
lawyer for each party is to be compensated for attending trial. This must de-
pend upon the complexity of the case and the role that each lawyer is play-
ing. For example, if a junior lawyer is present at trial primarily for the pur-
pose of organizing documents but takes a minor witness for educational 
purposes, consideration should be given to billing her time at a paralegal's 
rate. 
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3. Guidelines re Hourly Rates.5 
a. Lawyers admitted to the bar for less than eight years: $135-
170. 
b. Lawyers admitted to the bar for more than eight years: $190-
225. 
c. Paralegals and law clerks: $65. 
4. Reimlmrsable Expenses 
a. Generally, reasonable out-of-pocket expenses (including long-
distance telephone calls, express and overnight delivery services, 
computerized on-line research and faxes) are compensable at actual 
cost. 
b. Mileage is compensable at $0.30 per mile. 
c. In-house copying is compensable at $0.15 per page; commer-
cial copying is compensable at actual cost. 
5. These rates are intended solely to provide practical guidance to lawyers and 
judges when requesting, challenging and awarding fees. The factors estab-
lished by case law obviously govern over them. However, the guidelines may 
serve to make the fee petition less onerous by narrowing the debate over the 
range of a reasonable hourly rate in many cases. The guidelines were derived 
by informally surveying members of the bar concerning hourly rates paid on 
the defense side in employment discrimination and civil rights cases and ad-
ding an upward adjustment to account for the risk of nonpayment faced by a 
plaintiff's lawyer in the event that her client does not prevail. The guideline 
rates also are generally comparable to those applied by the court in several re-
cent cases involving the award of fees to plaintiffs' counsel after considering 
affidavits submitted in support of such rates. They do not apply to cases gov-
erned by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which sets an hourly rate by 
statute. 

